RECENT DISCUSSION OF THE RISE of anti-Americanism in South Korea tends to present it as a shocking and unprecedented phenomenon in the modern history of the South Korea-U.S. relations. This tendency is understandable, considering the longevity of the U.S.-South Korea military alliance, growing economic ties, and cultural exchanges across the Pacific over the last 50 years. Theories of interdependence suggest that mutual interests and growing understanding promote cooperation while reducing friction between the members. And the U.S.-South Korean relationship should be a prime example. In this regard—especially at the 50th anniversary of the signing of a mutual security treaty—the cries of “Yankee go home” in South Korea and the talk in Washington about “abandoning Korea” may indeed be regarded as shocking.

Headline-chasing may be a somewhat familiar practice of those who write on and study international relations. Thus it is not surprising that the surge of an anti-American movement in South Korea, manifested in the mass candlelight vigils for the two young Korean students who died in December 2002, has generated an equally sudden increase in writing on the topic. Perspectives vary in their readings of anti-American sentiment in South Korea in terms of its sources, its nature, any “danger” it represents, and its implications for U.S. foreign policymaking and regional security.

This paper will attempt to decipher the complex nature of Korean anti-Americanism in a historical and comparative context by examining some controversial themes central to the ongoing debates. It is organized to address the following four questions:

1. Is anti-Americanism in South Korea a new problem?
2. What is distinctive about Korean anti-Americanism?
3. Is it “dangerous”?
4. What should be done?

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This paper will suggest that both optimistic and pessimistic views fail to pay enough attention to the utilitarian elements of anti-Americanism in South Korea. Anti-Americanism has ebbed and flowed with issues and events over the past 50 years, and takes many different forms. Yet one can observe that a surprisingly high degree of pragmatism at both leadership and mass population levels has informed the various manifestations of Korean anti-Americanism. Finding ways to deal with the pragmatic concerns that create or support anti-American movements and slogans will be the critical first step toward constructive management of the bilateral relations between the United States and South Korea.

**KOREAN ANTI-AMERICANISM IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT: IS IT A NEW PROBLEM?**

Considering that the United States sacrificed 33,000 lives of American servicemen and servicewomen during the Korean War in defense of South Korea and still stations 37,000 troops there, it may be hard for Americans to believe that they are not loved by Koreans. U.S. media and policymakers alike are taken aback by the recent surge of public protest against and criticism of the American presence in Korea. Such “a serious breach of faith” produces emotional bitterness. “We are doing God’s work, and if people don’t appreciate it, there is something wrong with them.”

However, if one carefully reads the historical context of anti-American sentiment in Korea, there is no reason to be surprised by the “new” problem. After all, Korea has been known historically to maintain a deep distrust of foreigners including Japanese, Manchu, and Europeans. Until the late 1870s, Korean ruling elites, deeply steeped in Neo-Confucian teaching, refused contact with any country besides China. Korea persistently held onto “exclusionism” even when it was on the brink of losing independence in the 1800s. Embracing any other nation than China as an authority for respect, protection, and trust was not a comfortable practice for Korea.

Furthermore, it is unrealistic to assume that a “feeling of genuine warmth towards the U.S. with the sacrifice of thousands of young men and millions of dollars in aid” and the image of America as not merely a friend but a savior would continue to dominate the national psyche of Koreans more than half a century after the end of the Korean War. A recent public opinion poll revealed that South Koreans’ “special feelings” toward the United States were “lost” at least a decade ago. In 1994, about two thirds of Koreans showed positive feelings toward the United States; less than 15 percent responded negatively. The balance between positive and negative feelings has continued to shift, and, according to a Gallup Korea survey, negative feelings toward the United States became higher than positive feelings among Koreans in 2003 (54 percent
It would be equally unrealistic to expect that a military alliance forged in the aftermath of the Korean War 50 years ago would continue to operate smoothly. Even after the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-South Korean alliance system did not benefit from any major restructuring. This post-Cold War inertia stands in cold contrast to the expansion of NATO, the closing of the Subic Bay Naval Station and Clark Air Base in the Philippines, and the 1997 revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation Guidelines.

Third and lastly, it would be erroneous to suppose that anti-Americanism had been absent from this bilateral relationship until very recently. Even a cursory reading of history reveals numerous outbursts of anti-Americanism. General John Hodge, Commander to the U.S. military occupation of Korea, reported in 1945 a “growing resentment against all Americans;” Park Chung Hee and his conservative followers expressed anger and frustration about the unilateral decisions by the Nixon and Carter administration to reduce the United States Forces in Korea (USFK) and pressure diplomacy to abort nuclear weapons programs. In the 1980s, the United States was portrayed in Korea as an imperial power, the ultimate cause of a range of Korea’s maladies from national division to authoritarianism and social inequalities. Radical student activists occupied or set fire to official American facilities, while farmers and business organizations protested the U.S. prying open Korean markets for the sale of U.S. goods. For the last decade, the U.S.-South Korean bilateral relationship has had to endure the controversial Nogun-ri incident, the murder of Korean women by U.S. servicemen, the bombing accident in Maehyang-ri, the dumping of polluted materials in U.S. camps, and the controversies over the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). In fact the track record of the bilateral relationship is littered with persistent anti-Americanism in Korea and an equally persistent and selective amnesia among people on both sides of the Pacific.7

The historical context of Korean anti-Americanism suggests that “Why do they hate us?” is the wrong question to ask. Indeed, this question ought to be turned on its head. Instead of wondering why they hate us, we may need to inquire what made South Koreans with a deep aversion toward foreign presence and a strong nationalism accept a dominant American presence for such a long period of time. As Balbina Hwang points out, considering how the rapid political and economic changes in Korea itself have far outpaced the static American perspective on Korea, overall U.S.-South Korean relations have been remarkably stable. Further, it is understandable that South Koreans
would be psychologically tired of subjecting their national behavior to the Cold War logics, while postponing any opportunity to savor the “peace dividend” from the end of the Cold War. With a GNP about 20 times and defense spending two times that of the North, South Korea may well believe it is time to stop granting “privilege” treatment of the U.S. troops on its soil while sacrificing its own initiatives for peaceful coexistence and national reconciliation.

MULTIPLE ANTI-AMERICANISMS IN SOUTH KOREA: WHAT IS DISTINCTIVE ABOUT KOREAN ANTI-AMERICANISM?

Anti-Americanism means many things to many people, ranging from a fundamental rejection of America, “the Great Satan,” to academic or popular criticism of specific U.S. actions or policies. Writings on the subject universally warn that defining anti-Americanism for analytical purposes requires reference to a particular country and its relationship with the United States. However, even a definition of anti-Americanism (_panmi_) in the Korean context is not immune to facile generalization. Brad Glosserman compares anti-Americanism in Japan to a “thick cord that is composed of several strands.” Korean anti-Americanism is just as complex.

One of the most widely accepted definitions of anti-Americanism in Korea is Jinwung Kim’s categorization. Kim identifies two versions of anti-Americanism in Korea, “emotional” anti-Americanism (_panmi-jungso_) and “ideological” anti-Americanism ( _panmi-jooeui_ ). He argues that only a fraction of Koreans hold “ideological” anti-Americanism. Korean anti-Americanism should be regarded as “emotional” anti-Americanism—a collective reaction to the influential American presence, not a rejection of American civilization. Anti-Americanism as “-ism,” is, Kim argues, a misnomer and should be replaced with the term “anti-American sentiment.”

There exist at least eight terms in the Korean language describing images of the United States, each nuanced to suggest a distinct strand: _panmi_ (anti-America), _sungmi_ (worship America), _hyommi_ (loathe America), _chinmi_ (pro-American), _yonmi_ (associate with America), _yongmi_ (use America), _hangmi_ (resist America), and _pimi_ (criticize America). Chung-in Moon argues that multiple descriptors of anti-Americanism in the Korean language indicate that the Korean perception of the United States is neither fixed nor monolithic. It is Korea’s domestic politics, bilateral relations with the United States, and global context that make a different strand of anti-Americanism prominent. For example, _sungmi_ and _chinmi_ dominated the national psyche when the United States was portrayed as the liberator from Japanese colonialism, the security provider against the communist North, and the symbol of a land of prosperity and freedom. On the other hand, the image of America as the backer of military dictatorship, dictatorship’s
“accomplice” in the Kwangju incident, and a “trade bully” provoked hyommi and hangmi among college students and intellectuals in the 1980s. However, no fixed image of America, be it sungmi or hyommi, ever prevails in the collective perception of the United States in South Korea. If there has been any constant theme in Korea’s disposition toward America, it is yongmi (use America). Korea’s orientation toward the United States and the bilateral relationship has primarily turned on pragmatic and conditional, if not strategic, grounds. Under the overriding principle of yongmi, the other principles of chinmi, yonmi, and pimi are not really such different or contradictory reflections of Korea’s national interests.

For instance, during the Cold War, Koreans could accept aligning with the United States (yonmi) and acting as a member of the U.S.-led coalition (chinmi) as natural choices when the U.S. security umbrella was indispensable for national survival in the face of palpable threat from the Soviet Union and North Korea. On the other hand, criticizing the United States (pimi) for its unilateralism and assertive policy toward North Korea, which South Korea believes will make herself the primary victim of possible military retaliation from the North, appears to make “using America” the right course of action. In this regard, the fluctuation of anti-Americanism should be understood in terms of adaptation, method, and choice.

AMBIVALENCE AS A REFLECTION OF PRAGMATISM

Attention to pragmatism as a factor in Korea’s orientation toward the United States helps to decipher what outside observers may regard as inconsistent and contradictory South Korean behavior. On the one hand, hundreds of thousands of Koreans participated in a series of candlelight protests in front of the U.S. embassy in Seoul and called for the amendment of the SOFA. At the same time, most Koreans pour money and time into improving their English proficiency. Parents are eager to send their children to the United States for early education. Students in Korea welcome the initiatives by their colleges to hire a new faculty who can teach courses in English. Recently travel agencies have created tour packages for pregnant Korean mothers to visit the United States so that their newborn children will acquire U.S. citizenship.

Ambivalence is also manifested at official levels. Many U.S. government officials and media commentators have been puzzled by the changing tone in the South Korean government about the direction of U.S-South Korea security cooperation. Michael McDevitt, a retired U.S. Navy admiral who served for many years in South Korea, confessed the difficulties in maintaining with South Korean government the perception of a shared threat from the North. Admiral McDevitt reported that during the Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan regimes, the South Korean government often
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objected that the USFK tended to underestimate the hostility and military readiness of the North. Once the reconciliation process began, the South Korean government complained that the USFK assessment of the North Korean threat was unnecessarily alarming.14

U.S. policymakers in the current administration have also struggled to understand the shifting tone of voice of their South Korean counterparts. The Kim Young Sam government of South Korea criticized the Clinton administration’s engagement policy toward North Korea as “not understanding North Korea and being naïve,” and complained that the even-handed approach toward the two Koreas after the submarine incident in 1996 “deeply wounded the pride of many Koreans.”15 In contrast to such a hard-line anti-American voice, the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun regimes in South Korea criticized the firm U.S. attitude toward North Korea as responsible for the latter’s assertive actions. The last two South Korean leaderships have advocated engagement with the North, arguing that the “North Korean leader is wise enough to choose the open-ended road.”16

The common ideological strain that connects these multifarious attitudes of Koreans is what Koreans themselves call a firm “Korea-first” philosophy. The ultimate guidance of Korea’s choices with regard to national security, reunification with the North, and alliance with the United States comes not from dogmatism or emotionalism, but from concrete assessment of Korean national interests. One of the opinion leaders in Korean media once wrote on the rift between the Korean government and the Clinton administration during the first North Korean nuclear crisis that “Korea can be ‘pro-American’ when doing so is in accord with its national interests. One the other hand, Korea should be prepared to be ‘anti-American’ when national interests are at stake.”17

It is indicative that even during the 1960s and 70s, which are often described as a heyday of pro-American sentiment in South Korea, anti-American sentiment was palpable. President Park Chung Hee and his officials, even though admitting that maintaining a pro-American stance was indispensable for Korea’s economic growth and national security in the Cold War environment, privately disclosed his deep distrust of and antipathy toward the United States. For Park, whose favorite comment on the United States was “Miguk nomdui muol aro?” [“What do the American bastards know?”], chinmi (pro-America) was an unwelcome but necessary choice to fulfill yongmi.18

The Korea-first philosophy, or yongmi, has also influenced South Korea’s oscillation between hawkish and engagement policies toward North Korea. Conservatives in South Korea, who had been the most ardent pro-Americans, became the most critical of the United States during the first North Korean nuclear crisis. The overriding assumption in the conservative camp was that as the implosion of North Korea was imminent, and reunification of absorption would ensue, then South Korea will natu-
rally acquire North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. U.S. conciliatory policy toward North Korea would save the failing regime from its not-so-distant demise and thus obstruct South Korea’s plans to gain its own nuclear deterrence capabilities.

On the other hand, recent anti-American talk in the South Korean government stemmed from a fear of armed conflicts between the two Koreas. Since the 1997 financial crisis and in the context of the sunshine policy toward the North, the South Korean government no longer actively expects unification by absorption to provide a viable solution. Now the grievances and anxiety mainly stem from the Bush administration’s go-it-alone attitude and inflexible diplomacy, which are perceived to dangerously escalate the possibility of war. North Korea possessing nuclear weapons per se would not comprise a serious threat, since the South is already well within the range of devastating artillery attacks from the North. What is more dangerous is a preemptive use of force by the United States as an anti-proliferation measure, which would lead to a war. Such a fear was heightened earlier, in 1994, when South Korea learned that the Clinton administration was on the verge of launching a preemptive strike at Yongbyun nuclear facilities without consultation with Seoul.

In short, pro-American and anti-American orientations in South Korea are two sides of the same coin. They are not inherent attitudes or fixed templates, but opposing stands South Koreans may take when prioritizing urgent items of the national agenda in a given situation. The current South Korean leadership is no exception to this rule. South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun, who rode on the critical public sentiment toward the Untied States during the presidential election, has dropped calls for equal partnership and independent diplomacy and repeatedly emphasized that the avoidance of war and the survival of the nation should be the ultimate criteria for South Korea’s choices. Stressing that “any measures by the United States (on North Korea) can be . . . a matter of life and death for South Koreans,” he appealed to the public to “stop the candlelight vigils for the sake of promoting national security.” In his April speech to a national audience on the government’s decision to send troops to Iraq, Roh reiterated the same pragmatic principle: “Are we going to risk a war by being different from the United States? We must be different on some issues but (also) be able to coordinate our differences to prevent the crisis of war.”
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Assessing Korean Anti-Americanism: “Young and Dangerous?”

In a comparative context, Korean anti-Americanism is not a particular case, since it follows a global pattern. According to the 2003 Pew Global Attitudes Projects, the percentage of people holding a favorable view of the United States in South Korea (46 percent) is not particularly lower than other countries such as Germany (45 percent), France (43 percent), Russia (36 percent), but higher than Indonesia (15 percent). What makes the recent surge of anti-Americanism in Korea particularly important is its implications for the U.S.-Korea military alliance. After all, the endurance of the U.S.-Korea military alliance does not only require a continual review of its “hard” elements such as force deployment and structure, operational commands systems, and burden-sharing, but also the “soft” elements such as threat perceptions and collective identity, which are emphasized by the constructivist approach to international security. If the United States and South Korea no longer share a clear identity as “natural” and “inseparable” partners against a “common enemy” and “present danger,” their security cooperation cannot remain “business as usual” as it was in the past.

The most distinctive feature of anti-Americanism in Korea is that it is a generational phenomenon. The 2002 Pew Global Attitudes Projects survey finds that young people in South Korea, along with those in Canada, the Czech Republic, and Bangladesh, are particularly critical of the United States compared to older generations. According to the Dong-A Asahi Survey in November 2001 and April 2003, only South Koreans who remember or have personally experienced the Korean War expressed positive feelings toward the United States (42.1 percent in 2001 and 45.0 percent in 2003). Gallup Korea also reveals this generational gap. A favorable image of the United States was twice as high as a negative image among people in their fifties (56.3 percent vs. 26 percent) but among people in their twenties, a negative image was more than three times greater than a positive one (75.5 percent vs. 21.4 percent). In another pair of surveys, Koreans in their twenties were the only age group in which more people stated that U.S. forces in Korea should withdraw (66 percent in December 2002, 55 percent in June 2003) than that the U.S. forces should remain.

Comparison with Japan and China reinforces the conclusion that current anti-Americanism in Korea reflects a generational difference. Compared to the Korean case, Japanese perception of the United States is not only generally favorable, but also more or less constant across age groups; the distribution of opinions among people in their
twenties and thirties is similar to that among people in their fifties and sixties. By contrast, in China the general perception of the United States is even more hostile than in South Korea. However, there is no significant difference in opinion across age groups (see Table 1).

The rise of anti-Americanism among young Koreans is regarded as indicating erosion of the traditional *raison d’être* of the bilateral security relationship and increasing inclination toward North Korea’s call for national unity. The young generation in Korea has been most vocal against unilateral actions by the United States toward North Korea to avert nuclear weapons development. Younger Koreans do not view North Korea mainly as a proliferation threat, enemy, or a member of an “axis of evil.” This generation discounts the danger of nuclear North Korea, while identifying North Korea as a partner for economic cooperation and national reconciliation.

However, it is erroneous to identify anti-American sentiment among young Koreans as a pro-North Korean turn or an abandonment of the alliance with the U.S. Although driven by nationalist fervor, anti-American sentiment among young Koreans has a pragmatic and conditional nature and expresses their deep concern for their own personal interests and national safety.

If *yongmi* is expressed in terms of a Korea-first philosophy at the leadership level, it is expressed as a risk-averse, calculated pursuit of personal safety and well-being at the individual level. Young Koreans tend to approach ideological issues such as patriotism, nationalism, unification, and sovereign independence on normative and ideal grounds. But, once these issues directly affect their personal interests, they can show a remarkable turnaround. Such dualism results in apparently self-contradictory reactions and positions. They love their country, but would not come back from overseas should a war occur. They think negatively of America, but many of them prefer to have U.S. citizenship. They denounced the U.S. war against Iraq as unjust invasion, but support the government decision to dispatch troops for U.S.-Korean cooperation over the North Korean issue.

Despite the contradictions, a pragmatic theme can clearly be seen across young Koreans’ opinions when it comes to two key issues: the alliance with the U.S. and national unification. While younger Koreans are discontent with the American military presence in Korea and current U.S.-South Korean relations, they still prefer to maintain the presence of the U.S. forces in Korea. They perceive withdrawal of the U.S. forces mainly in symbolic terms, as a culmination of Korea’s efforts to achieve self-reliance and independence in the area of national security. At the same time, they are aware of the instrumental value of the U.S. forces and the financial and strategic implications of immediate and drastic changes in the military alliance.

Regarding unification, they support unification of Korea, but are extremely sen-
sitive to the costs of achieving it. When asked in 2003, “Do you believe reunification efforts should proceed regardless of economic conditions?” 45.6 percent of respondents in their twenties responded negatively. In a separate survey, 51.3 percent of people in their twenties said they are willing to help defectors from North Korea at their own sacrifice. Considering that the younger generation in South Korea does not appear predisposed to prioritizing “nationalist” agendas at the expense of material gains, it will be grossly misunderstood if these young people are lumped together as pro-unification dissidents or nationalists.

**Conclusion**

Because the image of a Korea as a stalwart ally has been so deeply entrenched in American psychology for the last half a century, many American officials, opinion leaders, and general public tend to see the recent burst of anti-American voices in South Korea as an unprecedented phenomenon, an ungrateful betrayal, and a dangerous pro-North Korean shift. This paper suggests that Korean anti-Americanism in a very recent period is not an anomaly at all; the anomaly is rather its long absence during the Cold War. The absence of anti-American expression in South Korea in the past did not mean the absence of anti-Americanism. It was a reflection of pragmatic stances adopted at official and personal levels to suit pressing political, economic, and security needs.

The image of the United States in the collective psyche of Koreans is neither fixed nor monolithic. Therefore, there are limits on what the United States can and cannot do about Korean anti-Americanism. As G. John Ikenberry puts it, given that the United States is an unchallenged hegemon, some of today’s anti-Americanism may be inevitable, but American posture and policy can change its character and intensity. The United States may not be able to defend against accusations of behaving as a dominant partner in an unequal alliance and pressing its global security goals, especially while the nuclear weapons program in North Korea remains as a main issue in its global anti-terrorist campaign. However, the United States needs to fully articulate a willingness to respect disagreement between the two allies and clarify its effort in making both U.S. and South Korean security priorities compatible and convergent.

Anti-Americanism in Korea is not something inevitable. It depends a great deal upon U.S. policies toward Korea. One critical testing ground for the U.S. to manage Korean anti-Americanism will be the current negotiations on the re-deployment of the U.S. Forces in Korea. It will be essential for the United States during negotiations to fully address South Korea’s desire for equal partnership and its fear of armed conflicts in the peninsula. While its attitudes toward the United States can be swathed in hyperbolic rhetoric and emotional bitterness, considering the pragmatic elements in its stance.
South Korea may be found surprisingly receptive to arguments that more distance in the alliance is not equal to its repudiation and restructuring the alliance would not restrict but, rather, expand Seoul's choices between Pyongyang and Washington, and options regarding reconciliation and avoidance of war.\(^4\) It is essential for Washington to persuade political elites and general public in South Korea with patience that overhaul of the alliance is neither abandoning South Korea nor disregarding common and enduring security interests of both sides. The United States must clearly demonstrate that proposed changes in the alliance are not only in its own interests, but also in Korea’s interests.

### NOTES

4. For a general discussion of Korea’s problems in defining their understanding of the United States in early modernization period, see Young-ick Lew, “Tong sjokaeuro bon Dameminsik (Perception of the United States over Time),” in Young-ick Lew and *et al.*, *Hankukinui Daemiinsik (Korean Perception of the United States)*.

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### TABLE 1: JAPANESE AND CHINESE PERCEPTION OF THE UNITED STATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LIKE</th>
<th>DISLIKE</th>
<th>NEUTRAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>59.4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(by age group) 20-24</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50s</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>59.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>60s</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>56.8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LIKE</td>
<td>DISLIKE</td>
<td>NEUTRAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHINA</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(by age group) 20s</td>
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<tr>
<td>50s</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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United States) (Seoul: Mineumsa, 1994).


12. It has been popular among student activists espousing hyummi and ideological anti-Americanism to denote the United States as a “land of tails,” rather than the official title in Korean language, (beautiful country). Critics of sungmi and chinmi tendency in South Korea as a new form of sadae (blindly serving big country) have often used the title “land of rice” to emphasize their objective disposition toward the United States.

13. Language Institutions were one of the very few industries which expanded and remained profitable during last year's economic recession in Korea. Dongsi Ilbo, 27 July, 2003; see also “A Short Cut to Better Spoken English: South Koreans Trimming Their Tongues to Improve Speech,” Rueter, 17 October, 2003.


24. J.J. Suh, Bound to Last, 56-79.


26. Donga-Asahi Survey, “Public Opinion in Korea,” 19-30 November, 2001: 3 (Face-to-face interviews with 2,000 people. Margin of error is 2.19 percentage points.)

Yongmi: Pragmatic Anti-Americanism in South Korea

Margin of error is 3 percentage points.
30. On the question “Do you think North Korea is likely to launch a war in the future?” 55.7 percent of the respondents said unlikely and 37.4 percent did likely in a survey conducted in February 2003, Chosun-Gallup Survey, “Possibility of North Korea Launching a War,” (National Poll Sampling of 1,013 Individuals, 3.1 percentage points margin of error) 25 February, 2003.
32. The Korean government began to increasingly focus on this element in dealing with anti-American sentiment among young generations. Political aid close to president Roh once remarked, “we are telling the young people that American troops are not just here for national security, but for our economic security. The young people don’t know the war, but hey know about their affluence.” President Roh himself asked the participants in the candle light vigils to assume a pragmatic approach toward North Korea and the United States: He said, “the North Korean nuclear problem is a matter of national survival, [and] revision of SOFA is a matter of matter of national pride.” The New York Times, 31 December, 2002, A1.
33. 43.4 percent of the Koreans in their 20s and 33.3 percent of the 30s said they would not come back from overseas should a war occur in the peninsula. Chosunilbo, “20s-30s Opinion Poll,” 31 December, 2002. 40.7 percent of Koreans wish to emigrate if possible, and this tendency is higher with younger people. Dongailbo, 24 February, 2003
34. In a college survey of 244 students, in which they are asked to choose between U.S. citizenship and Korean citizenship, 44.8 percent of them said they would choose U.S. citizenship and 55.5 percent said Korean citizenship. http://www.chosun.com/w21 data/html/news/w00310/200310060308.html (Last visit on October 11, 2003).
35. Yonhap, 8 October, 2003. 88.3 percent views U.S. war in Iraq as an “invasion” and 4.7 percent does a “just war.” However, 72.2 percent of them said Korean participation in the war was inevitable choice for national interests.
36. 78.1 percent of Koreans in their 20s and 84.3 percent of those in the 30s agree that the presence of the U.S. forces in Korea is “important for the security of the Korea.” Dongilbo, 1 April, 2003.
38. Dongailbo, Telephone Survey on 1,009 respondents with margin of error of 3.1 percent points, 8 March, 2003, p. 3, Table 1-2.
40. For a discussion that the reduction of the USFK will strengthen Seoul’s deterrence capability and inter-Korean diplomacy, see C.S. Elliot Kang, “Restructuring the US-South Korea Alliance to Deal with the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 309-324.
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