Two weeks after the first staff member was employed, C.C.I. was reluctantly involved in its first project, a case of vandalism in Coney Island. Efforts of Lewin to delay action were not successful. The A.J.C. insisted on C.C.I.'s help and thus the Coney Island project became C.C.I.'s initial "assignment." Others followed quickly. The Horace Mann School in New York asked for an evaluation of its intercultural program. This study included one of the earliest tests of the effectiveness of intergroup activity on the attitudes of participants. During the same period, three other inquiries were launched—two in Boston and one in a New Jersey industrial town—into the attitude of individual Jews toward their own group as measured by synagogue attendance, observance of dietary laws and religious holidays, friendship with non-Jews, attitude toward intermarriage, and affiliation with Jewish and mixed social clubs.

In Chicago, C.C.I.'s Midwest Regional office probed the roots of an attack on the Jewish center in Hyde Park, consulted with school officials concerned over Negro-white tensions in nearby Gary,
Indiana, and measured the impact of anti-Semitic speeches by Gerald L. K. Smith and his associate Arthur Terminello.

C.C.I.’s programs drew considerable newspaper and magazine attention. Though not all the published articles were entirely satisfactory to Lewin and his colleagues in C.C.I., the pieces did provide the kind of public exposure that the Commission’s supporters within the A.J.C. welcomed, and the social scientists on C.C.I.’s staff felt that the press was important in communicating their methods and goals.

Under Lewin’s direction C.C.I. brought the A.J.C. intellectual prestige and greatly expanded influence. But, as Lewin had predicted, mounting demands for “fire-fighting” projects put an ever-growing load on the C.C.I. staff. Pressures were increasing to de-emphasize long-range scientific research in favor of direct and militant short-range social action. At the same time, the need for publicity (arising out of dependence on the public for funds, competition with other Jewish agencies, and criticisms from activists within the A.J.C. who did not understand the farsighted program C.C.I. was trying to set up) led to frequent policy changes. These distractions, plus a serious problem which arose concerning the financing of C.C.I., took their toll. The promised million dollars was not in hand; a large part of it had to be raised, and the A.J.C. demanded frequent cutbacks in the long-range program. One of the first casualties was Hendry, who resigned as C.C.I.’s research director in July 1946.

Lewin was distressed and wrote to Hendry on April 5, 1946, “I was very tired but went back to New York to fight the battle. If you and I, Stuart Cook, and Alfred Marrow would stick together through whatever comes, I feel we will win. There will be painful things to do, but they have to be done. You are well aware that absolute, long-range security for research is rarely ever found. In any type of action research in the social field, security can never be anything given on a legal contract level which one can ‘have and forget about.’ Social action is a part of a changing social world. Security in action research has to be re-established anew every day. I consider this crisis one of life or death for C.C.I., and I am ready to go to any lengths to find a productive solution for our basic enterprise. I for one am not ready to give up.”
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Lewin's skill at working with the leaders of the A.J.C. brought about a temporary solution to the harassing problems. The activities continued to expand and new projects were often undertaken before the manpower was available. But Lewin remained calm and confident. During the next five years more than fifty separate projects involving all four varieties of action research were carried out. The following are some of the most pertinent.

Gang Behavior

An "incident" between Jewish and non-Jewish teenagers on Yom Kippur was the basis for the first major C.C.I. study. A gang of Italian Catholic teenagers had disturbed the religious services of Yom Kippur at a synagogue in Coney Island. Though the incident had occurred before C.C.I. was ready to take on any assignments, the leaders of the A.J.C. felt that public interest in the event provided an unusual opportunity to demonstrate the value of a scientific approach to this kind of situation. They urged Lewin to take the event for his first action-research project. He agreed reluctantly, for at the time his staff consisted of only two persons. He assembled a task force including Jews, Protestants, Catholics, and Negroes. He drew them from group workers and psychologists on a part-time basis. All had been trained in research in human relations and were able to talk the language of both youths and grownups.

Their first step was to halt the legal action against the four young men arrested for creating the disturbance. The complaint was withdrawn and the boys were put in charge of the local priest and the Catholic Big Brothers.

C.C.I.'s next step was to canvass local attitudes and to involve as many citizens of the community as possible, since such participation would make action toward improvement more likely. A survey of representative community attitudes indicated that the disturbance had not resulted from organized anti-Semitism but was rather a symptom of an undirected, general sentiment of hostility. Aggression happened to turn on Jews on Yom Kippur because on this holy day the Jews were more conspicuous.
Nor was it an instance of delinquency that could be corrected by sending the juveniles to jail. The real problem, the survey disclosed, lay in the frustrations and disappointments which all the people in the community experienced every day of their lives; eliminating those would be the solution. This meant providing more and better housing, building recreational centers, improving transportation. Especially desirable were activities bringing together different racial and religious groups in a friendly atmosphere. These had to be planned.

The findings were brought to the attention of the Mayor's Committee on Human Relations and led to a promise to provide some of the needed facilities. C.C.I. was requested to continue to serve as consultant to the community and work closely with the gang that had started the Yom Kippur fight. Russell Hogrefe of the C.C.I. staff was assigned to this task. It took several months for him to win their confidence, and he then continued to work with them for a year.

The study had begun with three queries: (1.) Can the gang learn to behave in a way more acceptable to the community? (2.) Can the group’s energies be redirected toward constructive activities? (3.) Can their negative attitudes of opposition and aggression be changed? At the end of a year, the answer to the first two questions was “yes.” On the third, the findings were equivocal.

C.C.I. summed up the conclusions in a report 1 which indicated that the gang’s relations with the adult world had vastly improved. The boys gave evidence of wanting to please adults, to whom they looked for recognition. Fighting had dropped off sharply. Energies were altered into constructive channels. Although there were no conspicuous changes of attitude toward the Negro and Jewish groups, aggression toward these groups had tapered off. Street fights with them had almost ceased. The gang’s trend toward socially approved behavior was sustained. This implied significant changes. The ultimate measure of the success of the project was the fact that the changes endured after the consultant was withdrawn.


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The group had become more and more self-sufficient and independent in maintaining its new ways. The upshot of this successful pioneer adventure in action research was to provide a pattern for an attack on the problems of a world of street gangs, cellar clubs, and ethnic rivalries which has since been adopted by many private and public agencies across the country.

Law and Social Change

Conferring with Lewin, the A.J.C. leaders took up the problem of *numerus clausus* in American colleges and universities. Lewin had expressed the view that discrimination often was the cause of prejudice, not the result of it, and that an alteration of behavior could bring a change of attitude. He held that if universities were required by law to admit students on merit and not on the basis of race or religion, the new practice would bring new and more favorable attitudes.

Lewin felt that the idea that "you can't legislate good will" is not always valid. There are many situations where legislation and law could be psychologically sound tools. Withdraw the support of the milieu from discrimination and you weaken its base. The object of prejudice is put in a new context, which may make apparent hitherto unnoticed traits that the prejudiced person has ignored. Legislation firmly enforced and supplemented with a broad program of community education could be highly effective in overcoming discrimination.

With this concept in mind, the president of the A.J.C. filed suit to challenge the *numerus clausus* maintained by the Medical School of Columbia University. The issue became a front-page story. The Medical School first denied that it had a quota for Jews but refused to open its selection system for inspection or to make a formal announcement of non-discrimination. The case was settled out of court when the University agreed to make available in the future the appropriate records, which would show whether or not there
was a discriminatory quota, and to state publicly that all applicants would be judged without regard for race or religion.

This challenge to the quota system of a publicly supported private institution resulted in a revision of discriminatory policies by leading schools of higher learning throughout the country.

Integration of Negro Sales Personnel

Another and quite different critical issue was presented to the C.C.I. staff for action. To find the answer Gerhart Saenger and Emily Gilbert set up a study which sought the facts about the department-store practice of not hiring Negroes as sales clerks because, as the store management put it, "our customers wouldn't stand for it." The researchers first interviewed store customers who had dealt with Negro clerks and others who had dealt with white clerks at work near Negroes. In addition, interviews were held on sidewalks with white persons in order to assemble street samples whose responses could be used as a control.

All respondents who showed signs of prejudice were asked directly whether they would continue to shop in stores that hired Negro salespeople. To the question "What would you think if all New York department stores hired Negro sales persons?" 64 per cent of the shoppers and 75 per cent of the street sample said they would approve. Of the group observed being waited on by Negro clerks, 20 per cent said they disapproved, whereas 21 per cent of the group observed with white clerks and 14 per cent of the street sample said they would resent being waited on by Negroes. The rest had no opinion.

Among the respondents were a dozen persons who expressed extreme prejudice and said they would not shop in a store which hired Negro sales help. But five of these had earlier been observed shop-

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ping not only in such a store but at a counter served by a Negro! And two of them had themselves been waited on by the Negro!

The investigators concluded: “Whatever a customer’s prejudice, it did not keep him from buying from Negro clerks. Customers accepted the situation they found in the store as a fait accompli, and, therefore, prejudice did not deter a person from accepting Negro sales help.”

The results of this study confirmed that New York department stores were unduly apprehensive about the force of public prejudice against fair employment practices. Their fear that sales would be hurt was not supported by the evidence.

Group Loyalty

The active role taken by members of Lewin’s M.I.T. staff in C.C.I. research is illustrated in a study by Festinger based on the belief that fellow members of the Jewish group were loyal to one another. This belief was demonstrated to be a mistaken one in an experiment on the “Role of Belongingness in a Voting Situation.” Festinger brought together several groups of college girls from in and around Boston, strangers to one another, with an equal number of Catholics and Jews in each group. To each group he assigned two of his assistants, in the role of students. All of the girls in the experiment were identified by numbers only and were instructed not to reveal their names.

Then they were asked to nominate a “president” for their several groups on the basis of first impressions. They nominated by number and their voting was secret. (Festinger was able to identify each voter.) After the ballots were collected, it was announced—falsely—that the two assistants posing as college girls had been nominated. Then a vote was taken, but by design it was pretended that because of some confusion in the counting a second ballot would have to be held.

Between the first and the second ballot it was suggested in an
offhand way that one candidate was Jewish and the other Catholic. (The two assistants posed alternately as Jew and Catholic to nullify personality differences.) The results showed that Catholics who had first voted for Jews tended to switch their votes to the Catholic candidate, but the Jews who had voted for the Catholic made no significant change. In personal interviews with Festinger, both the Catholic and the Jewish students had expressed liking for members of their own group. The Catholics alone, however, carried preferences through into action.

Integrated Housing

C.C.I. staff members had long recognized that just throwing people together—commingling Negroes and whites, Christians and Jews, Puerto Ricans and New Englanders—did not necessarily render their feelings toward one another kindlier. Lewin maintained that it was the manner in which the diverse people came together, especially whether or not they met as equals, which determined whether understanding improved or tensions heightened. What, Lewin asked, is the effect of opening public housing to all races and religions? Is it an antidote to the fear and hatred that exists among many of New York City’s different ethnic groups? Does the quality of status defined by living together in the same building build healthier attitudes? Does one really know?

Lewin raised these questions at the time when public housing was being projected as a means of providing decent housing for slum dwellers. Negroes and whites were encouraged to rent space in the new projects, and their proximity offered fresh opportunities to observe interracial relations. A new concept in America’s postwar culture, interracial housing offered two types of occupancy. One segregated Negroes and whites in separate buildings in a “checkerboard” pattern within the project. The other integrated all buildings on a first-come, first-served basis without regard to color.

To appraise the effects of these diverse situations, C.C.I. commis-
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sioned a study by two part-time staff members, Morton Deutsch and Mary Evans Collins. They selected four interracial housing projects,\(^3\) two integrated, and two "checkerboard." Interviews were planned to draw out white attitudes toward the Negro neighbors and the whites' relations with the Negroes. These interviews were designed to probe deeply and lasted up to two hours. They were held with 100 white housewives and 25 Negro housewives. In addition, 24 Negro and white adolescent boys and girls were interviewed.

The results disclosed a sharp contrast in attitudes between the residents of integrated and segregated housing projects, even though the buildings matched in every particular of physical facilities, environment, and Negro-white ratios and differed only in occupancy patterns. In the segregated projects, resentments toward Negroes were much sharper and anti-Negro prejudice stronger; indeed, the white residents expressed a strong preference for still greater segregation.

On the other hand, where whites came to know Negroes as next-door neighbors, they shared a growing sense of common humanity which relaxed the tensions they had brought with them and replaced antagonism with friendliness. The change was expressed (among other responses) by their preference for more and more widely integrated housing. Also, they drew more closely together and became more genuinely good neighbors. The answers of housewives in the segregated projects, on the other hand, showed them to be more peevish, suspicious, and hostile toward others, including other whites.

The indication was that the manner in which people live together in a common dwelling can be a strong factor in shaping their relations as members of groups. Group cohesiveness and morale were higher in the integrated than in the segregated projects. White residents in integrated houses, despite initial forebodings, came to like living in them; many of them expressed pride in their building's "democracy."

\(^3\) This study was planned with Lewin but carried out after his death.
Though even those well disposed toward interracial projects had been convinced that any Negro ratio going much above 50 per cent meant "trouble," the study found no valid evidence that ratios per se had any effect on good will. The most cordial relations seemed to exist in the integrated project with 70 per cent Negro occupancy.

The C.C.I. study by Deutsch and Collins was among the first using scientific methods to discover whether or not integrated housing is "workable." The evidence showed that it is.

Sensitivity Training—The Origin of the T Group

In the summer of 1946, Lewin directed another pioneering experiment of major social significance. The Connecticut State Interracial Commission had asked him to help in training leaders and conducting research on the most effective means for combating racial and religious prejudice in communities. This led to the creation in 1947 of the National Training Laboratories, which, according to Warren Bennis, "have now grown to be an internationally recognized and powerful educational force affecting almost all of the social institutions in our society." The original aims of this laboratory were to help people deal more effectively with complex human relationships and problems. Its method is usually called "sensitivity training" and sometimes "laboratory" or "group dynamics" training. Many authorities believe that it carries more promise for the amelioration of social problems than any current alternative.

It began in 1946 with a phone call to Lewin. The director of the Connecticut State Commission was troubled by his staff's inability to translate latent forces of good will in communities into overt endeavors to overcome various forms of bias. As Frank Simpson, the Commission's executive director, explained to Lewin, the Commission's efforts to implement the program had created serious doubts about its effectiveness.

Simpson's call came at a time when C.C.I. was troubled about its

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own form and function. It was understaffed, with a high work load. Nevertheless, Lewin was determined to try out a new design for leadership training. Despite lack of money, know-how, and adequate staff, the help requested by the Connecticut State Commission was to be provided.

Lewin's own group at M.I.T. had already assembled a veritable stockpile of general ideas about group behavior from leadership studies with the Boy Scouts and in industry. These he believed were ready to be tested by experiments on community action. He proposed that the Connecticut training program be pre-designed as a workshop in which a "change" experiment could be conducted. The workshop was simultaneously to train its members, assemble observations on the whys and wherefores of the changes that developed in the trainees, measure their extent, and analyze the outcome. In sum, the workshop would simultaneously train the delegates and provide research data on what produced the changes.

The first task was to assemble a trained staff. As a hard core there were Ronald Lippitt, Leland Bradford, and Kenneth Bené, who headed a large team of trainers, observers, and researchers under Lewin's direction. With the three leaders, Lewin began to work out the design for the workshop to be held in June 1946 at Teachers' College, New Britain, Connecticut.

The program called for two weeks of training for forty-one hand-picked students, of whom most were professional educators or social-agency workers. Only a few were labor leaders and businessmen. About half the trainees were Negroes and Jews, with the sensitivities characteristics of both groups. What the participants were hoping to gain from the workshop was sought by means of interviews. Their expectations varied, but generally they hoped to develop greater skill in dealing with other people, more reliable methods of changing people's attitudes, insight into reasons for resisting change, a more scientific understanding of the causes of prejudice, and a more reliable insight into their own attitudes and values.

The workshop began with a program that encouraged discussion and decision by the entire group, launching at once the practice of initiating common activities. The staff treated the members as peers.
All were introduced in about three minutes. The leaders of the training and research teams briefly explained the recording equipment and the other data-collecting devices and how to use them. Fifteen minutes later the meeting became the workshop.

During their training period, most participants returned home for an evening’s visit with their families. Those who remained on campus had nothing to do but sit around, and they asked if they might sit in on the feedback meetings in which the research staff (Deutsch, Murray Horwitz, Arnold Meier, and Melvin Seeman) reported on the unprocessed data they had collected in observing the three groups of trainees. Most of the staff feared that it would be harmful to have the trainees sit in while their behavior was being discussed. Lewin, however, saw no reason why the researchers should keep data to themselves, nor why feedback to the trainees should not be helpful. The result—in the words of Bradford—was like a “tremendous electric charge . . . as people reacted to data about their own behavior.” Thus, the role of feedback in a T (training) group was discovered.

As Lippitt describes it,5 “Sometime during the evening, an observer made some remarks about the behavior of one of the three persons who were sitting in—a woman trainee. She broke in to disagree with the observation and described it from her point of view. For a while there was quite an active dialogue between the research observer, the trainer, and the trainee about the interpretation of the event, with Kurt an active prober, obviously enjoying this different source of data that had to be coped with and integrated.

“At the end of the evening, the trainees asked if they could come back for the next meeting at which their behavior would be evaluated. Kurt, feeling that it had been a valuable contribution rather than an intrusion, enthusiastically agreed to their return. The next night at least half of the fifty or sixty participants were there as the result of the grapevine reporting of the activity by the three delegates.

“The evening session from then on became the significant learn-

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ing experience of the day, with the focus on actual behavioral
events and with active dialogue about differences of interpretation
and observations of the events by those who had participated in
them.

"The staff were equally enthusiastic, for they found the process a
unique way of securing data and interpreting behavior. In addition,
the staff discovered that feedback had the effect of making partici-
pants more sensitive to their own conduct and brought criticism
into the open in a healthy and constructive way."

In addition to these new, individual feedback sessions, the partici-
pants in each group spent about 18 per cent of their time appraising
their own behavior. They held these sessions in the evening for an
hour and a half.

When the workshop terminated, both staff and participants were
satisfied that it had been a success. But the real test of the training’s
effectiveness was how well the trainees used their new knowledge
and skills back home. Six months after they had gone back to work,
they and their co-workers were interviewed. The responses dis-
closed that 72 per cent reported that they were using the new
methods—role playing being the most frequently cited. About 75
per cent declared that they were now more skillful in improving
group relations. They spoke also of their own increased sensitivity
to the feelings of others and of their greater optimism about making
progress. From every source came reports of changed performance
in working with people, in planning action, in bridging the gaps
between good intentions and actual behavior.

A consequence of the Connecticut leadership training workshop
was the establishment the following summer of the National Train-
ing Laboratories (N.T.L.). It was housed in the Gould Academy,
at Bethel, Maine, and financed initially by a grant Lewin obtained
from the Office of Naval Research. Before the laboratory could
hold its first session, Lewin died, never to know that this brainchild
of his would become a permanent organization of national scope
and that it would lead to some of the most significant contributions
to the scientific study of human relationships.

Carl Rogers recently wrote that “sensitivity training is perhaps
the most significant social invention of this century. The demand for it is utterly beyond belief. It is one of the most rapidly growing social phenomena in the United States. It has permeated industry, is reaching families, professionals in the helping fields and many other individuals."  

Bradford, one of the leaders at the 1946 workshop, and director and leading spirit of N.T.L. since its formation in 1947, believes that Lewin would have been "proud at the vast growth of sensitivity training as a technique and of the National Training Laboratories as a center of continuing research in the field. Lewin's great concept of creating "here and now" data, analyzing it, and using feedback remains the essential element in all the many variations of sensitivity training and encounter groups that have developed on every continent and in almost every land."

The Community Self-Survey—A Barometer for Bias

One of the most practical action-research projects was the Community Self-Survey of Discriminatory Practices. Psychologists know that emotional retraining is always a most difficult undertaking. It is far easier to measure the extent of discriminatory conduct, for example, than to get action on it. It is this problem that Lewin and the staff had long discussed. How can facts be found in such a way that they will lead to action?

Lewin had frequently referred to the situation in most communities in which a few citizens were bothered by the existence of local discrimination and the majority preferred to think that conditions were satisfactory or improving. They chose to disregard the actualities. Many communities, when pressured by a minority for some action program, resorted to outside experts to develop information about where the prejudice was and what strength and form it took among them. But some had become aware of the shortcomings of

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this approach. Few people cared about the experts' work, which was expensive, and public interest in it waned. Eventually the experts' report was delivered, filed, and forgotten. It rarely led to action.

Various urban communities put a considerable amount of pressure on Lewin and C.C.I. (mostly through members of the A.J.C.) to provide help. A particular problem was discriminatory practices in the community. C.C.I.'s small staff could not respond to all the requests for help in studying local discrimination, and those making the requests had only vague notions about the scope of the prejudice of which they complained and about where it was most widespread. It was necessary to create a dynamic nexus between fact finding and action. It was this search which led to the devising of the community self-survey.

Ideally a community self-survey would elicit genuine and significant participation on the part of citizens in this matter. Self education is the goal, so that citizens are prepared, after a period of discovery and training, to play a more constructive role in rooting out discriminatory practices in their communities. What was wanted, Lewin stated to the C.C.I. staff, was a method that would:

1. Uncover the facts.
2. Show areas of greatest discrimination where countermeasures could be most effectively applied.
3. Provide an accurate measure of discrimination so that future surveys could indicate what progress had been made.
5. Get the kind of information that would enable discussion of what to do and how to do it.
6. Get community involvement so that action would follow fact finding. Residents would take seriously the facts that they themselves uncovered. Their findings should lead them to press for action because of their own energetic involvement.

To achieve these results, C.C.I. devised an Index of Discrimination. The Index could be translated as readily as a barometer reading. It established a procedure which carried research over into ac-
tion. It was economical to set up and run, and it centered on people and organizations rather than on mere fact finding.

The place chosen for the pilot survey was called "Northtown." Located near New York City, "Northtown" had a population of 40,000—12 per cent of them Negroes, 9 per cent Jews—very much an "average" Eastern city. The Northtown survey took two and a half months to collect its data. It recorded a total of 409 interviews. Of these, 304 were family interviews (including 101 white Christians, 99 Negroes, 104 Jews); 35 were interviews with employers; 23 with real estate dealers; 20 with public and private school administrators; and 27 with functionaries in public accommodations and services. The data showed discrimination in every area investigated. That in itself was not surprising. But the intensity of discrimination and number of areas covered was an eye opener to most people.

Employment revealed the most glaring disparities. Earnings of Negroes were far less than those of whites with similar education. Negroes who attended only grammar school earned $1.08 an hour, whites $1.21. Housing showed Negroes at a most marked disadvantage. Comprising 12 per cent of the population, they were crowded into 5 per cent of the residential area.

In February 1948, the Northtown citizen committee reported its findings to representatives of all the sponsoring organizations. This project, which resulted in the development of a Barometer for Bias, represented a great step forward. A self-survey technique had been standardized; a measurement instrument, the Index of Discrimination, had been developed. The low costs involved would permit wide application of the techniques. (A self-survey the size of the Northtown program could be conducted for as little as $600, plus minor expenses necessary for professional and clerical service.)

The tools were now available for any community that wanted to roll up its sleeves and do its own job on discrimination. The Index of Discrimination would make it possible for communities to compare their practices with each other. It would also make possible annual self-assessment to measure the progress in their own community. Seventeen communities were soon conducting such self-surveys.
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Handling Bigots

In another study C.C.I. addressed itself to finding out whether or not prejudice is encouraged to flourish in an atmosphere of silent acceptance. If, for example, a bigot feels free to make a remark in a department-store elevator or a crowded bus about “damned niggers” or “pushy Jews,” does it indicate acceptance of bias if his listeners remain silent? Lewin believed that these incidents are not trivial, for most attitudes—good and bad—are most effectively spread through small face-to-face groups. The more intimate the group, the deeper the prejudice is planted.

What, then, could one do about public hate-mongering of this sort? Should one challenge the bigot? Or did that do more harm than good? And if one challenged him, what should be said? And how should one say it? In an unusually complete experimental study, a number of basically important facts were discovered.

The first big question facing the study was whether or not a bigot should be reprimanded. There might just be something in the common-sense formula so often heard: “It’s best to mind your own business.”

In the first set of experiments a number of different playlets were used, and in each instance the audience was carefully canvassed to discover whether it preferred to have the bigot ignored rather than answered as in the dramatization. To make sure that the bystander’s preference with regard to answering the bigot was not influenced by the manner in which he was refuted or told off, two distinctly different manners were used: one, calm and quiet; the other, excited and militant. The experimental routine consisted of presenting three versions of an incident to each audience group: one without an answer to the bigot, one quietly answered, one angrily answered.

The sequence of the versions was varied so that the order did not affect the choice.

Altogether, 199 experimental bystanders were tested in the pilot study. Of these, 65 per cent preferred the calm answer; 15 per cent, the excited, harsh answer; and 20 per cent, "no answer." This finding was completely confirmed by later experiments. Most significant, however, was the evidence that four out of five bystanders did not want to see the bigot go unchallenged. This meant that the individual who spoke up in public against stereotyped slurs on minorities could be assured that a typical group of bystanders would be on his side. A dignified manner of answering was preferred, but some kind of answer was definitely wanted by the group that overheard the remark.

This portion of the pilot study made it clear that "you don't remain silent." The problem then became: What kind of answer? To discover this, audience reactions were studied by a number of methods. There were 513 persons in this part of the investigation. A preference was expressed for using "American tradition" as against "individual differences." However, 80 per cent strongly preferred any answer at all to silence, and 68 per cent of the subjects preferred the calm, quiet manner. On the basis of these findings the investigators recommended that public slurs against minorities be answered by appeals based on either democracy or individual differences, and answered quietly.